



Homeland Security

Comprehensive Reviews Yield Effective Practices for Homeland Security

Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to “serve as the principal Federal officer to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to protect the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR).”

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) establishes the blueprint for enhancing protective security across all 17 CI/KR sectors. The NIPP seeks cost-effective protective programs that feature security partnerships, cost sharing measures, integrated communications, and sharing of information concerning physical threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and best practices.

In 2005, the DHS Risk Management Division introduced the Comprehensive Review as a structured cooperative inter-agency process to achieve the objectives of assessing prevention, mitigation, and response capabilities for high consequence CI/KR facilities. In less than a year, Comprehensive Reviews have already resulted in numerous benefits to identify readily adaptable, low-cost protective measures for increased readiness and preparedness in the event of an unthinkable terrorist attack or natural disaster.

The Nuclear Sector was the first of the CI/KR sectors to participate in these reviews. Because commercial nuclear reactors are generally perceived to be high consequence assets, a number of Federal agencies were directed to complete various assessments involving them. While recognizing that nuclear plants are the best-protected assets of our critical infrastructure, those Federal agencies and the nuclear industry recognized

the value of a unified, collaborative effort to enhance the protection of these vital assets. Comprehensive Reviews will also be conducted in other sectors having high-consequence characteristics. The Chemical Sector pilot was conducted in March 2006.

The process builds upon the extensive efforts of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency and the industry’s investments to augment protective security and response capabilities immediately following 9/11.

Comprehensive Review

The Comprehensive Review is a government and private sector no-fault analysis of CI/KR facilities to determine the facilities’ exposure to potential terrorist attack, the consequences of such an attack, and the integrated prevention and response capabilities of the owner/operator, local law enforcement, and emergency response organizations.



The results are used to enhance the security posture of the facilities and community first responders by (a) using short-term improvements in equipment, training, and processes; and (b) informing longer-term risk-based investments and science and technology decisions.

The approach is a substantial departure from traditional Federal sequential inspections. Now, Federal agencies

meet together with industry representatives, local law enforcement, and emergency responders to conduct a joint analysis of the multiple functions required to detect, deter, defend, mitigate, and respond to a potential terrorist event.

Effective Practices for Improving Site and Community Security Posture

Comprehensive Review teams have observed efficient and effective practices at various sites for enhanced readiness and preparedness for a potential terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. The following is a summary of such practices that other CI/KR facilities and surrounding communities may consider:

Communications

Effective communication among site, local law enforcement (LLE), and emergency first responders is a fundamental principle of successful planning and response to a terrorist threat or action. Key practices include:

- The use of interoperable hand-held radios and other communications equipment that enable sites and LLE, including state, county, and Department of Natural Resources police, to communicate directly with one another.
- The use of communication repeaters that facilitate reliable communications throughout the facility. These repeaters solve interference problems normally encountered due to construction and geographic constraints.
- The use of communications repeaters to enable encrypted communications while responding to potential incidents at a plant.
- The establishment of on-going dialogue among owner/operators, fire fighters, law enforcement, first responders and state agencies, including monthly meetings and regular exercises.
- The use of a meteorological plant data acquisition system or other similar monitoring systems that allow individual Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) the capability to monitor plant status in the absence of voice information.

Surveillance

There are a number of actions that CI/KR facilities can undertake to deter an adversary by improving surveillance of the property and surrounding areas from

which a potential terrorist attack could be planned or launched. Key practices observed include:

- Engaging the public to report suspicious activity through programs such as the USCG's *America's Waterway Watch Program*.
- Including frequent observations of the water approaches to a facility. Some facilities use zoom cameras to effectively monitor boat traffic in surrounding navigable waterways.
- Using low-light vision and thermal imaging equipment that permit surveillance in the buffer zone surrounding a facility at night or in foggy conditions.
- Providing docks for mooring patrol boats to increase maritime law enforcement presence around the facility.



Coordinated Training

Different organizations have responsibilities and will take actions to prevent and respond to potential terrorist activities. Some facilities and their community partners have effective practices to coordinate their training.

- Conducting joint training among local SWAT and Army Reserve units providing military and aviation support assets to rapidly transport tactical teams to a site in the event of a terrorist-initiated event.
- Training of county corrections officers as a source of additional personnel to offset demands on tactical response officers while at the same time providing for efficient evacuation if needed.
- Conducting joint training with local sheriff's office and site security personnel that includes movement exercises; critical asset recognition and defense; and target set protection. This provides LLE tactical

knowledge of the facility and familiarity with the site's tactical response plans.

- Planning, analysis of resource needs, and training exercises in the event of a combined radiological/terrorist threat developed by an Inter-Jurisdictional Planning Committee that meets on a monthly basis. The committee includes responsible emergency management and law enforcement organizations.

Operations Planning

Effective protection of our critical infrastructure, coordinated response, and rapid recovery is based on coordinated plans and working partnerships among the various organizations that would be called upon to respond to potential threats and events. Sound practices that CR teams observed include:

- Establishing an Integrated Law Enforcement Response Group composed of site security, local law enforcement and the FBI that conducts tabletop exercises and full field exercises for all responding agencies and site security.
- Establishing effective working relationships between facility and local law enforcement, providing access to site firing ranges and other training facilities, and knowledge of critical assets and plant defensive strategy. Providing office space for sheriff's deputies to use when on site, reinforcing the relationship and encouraging the presence of local law enforcement
- Establishing pre-planned assembly areas to muster emergency response and law enforcement personnel if access to the site should become blocked or restricted. Coordinating access to the site from the mustering location for all responders.
- Coordinating site, law enforcement, and emergency response plans to eliminate use of the same assets for conflicting tasks.

Shared Resources

CR teams found a number of innovations that communities and private sector facilities have used to share personnel and equipment resources that help offset potential costs and eliminate redundancies in protective security measures. Some of these include:

- Establishing a shared emergency response force that can be activated by the Chief Executive Officer of any town within the county.

- Using the state and local assets to conduct patrols of the maritime security zone surrounding the facility.
- Using state police for advanced detection and interdiction.
- Integrating the local bomb squad capabilities into other special operations components of the state police (SWAT, dive, K-9, and Explosive Detection).
- Establishing and using a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies to create a Critical Response Team to support the site. The MOU details incident command procedures, including command post, alternate command posts, assembly areas, and liaison personnel.
- Establishing a medical credentialing program that allows licensed medical professionals to seamlessly provide medical services at all hospitals throughout the state during times of emergency.



Status

While there are many challenges ahead to secure the range of our nation's infrastructure, Comprehensive Reviews reveal the extent to which industry and communities can implement affordable changes in equipment, training, and processes to enhance homeland security measures in a relatively short period of time. Plans are underway to apply the methodology to other high consequence sectors.