Nuclear Plant Disaster Plan Is Inadequate, Report Says
By RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD
The New York Times
January 11, 2003

Emergency plans are inadequate to protect the public from a disastrous leak of radiation at the Indian Point nuclear plant in Westchester County and do not fully take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack, according to a report commissioned by Gov. George E. Pataki and released yesterday.

The report, a comprehensive review of the ways local and state officials would respond to a disaster, paints a picture of potential chaos brought on by panicked parents rushing to pick up children from schools, firefighters unsure what to do and antiquated computer technology hampering predictions of where the radiation might be headed and how many people would be at risk.

Contrary to repeated assurances from state and federal officials in the past, the report said the plan was "not adequate" to "protect the people from an unacceptable dose of radiation in the event of a release from Indian Point, especially if the release is faster or larger" than currently anticipated. It said that the plan, created by the state, the counties surrounding the plant, and Entergy, the plant's owner, assumes an accidental release rather than a deliberate release from an attack.

"Simply stated, the world has recently changed," said the report, by James Lee Witt, a private consultant and former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. "What was once considered sufficient may now be in need of further revision."

Mr. Witt was not asked to consider whether the plant should be shut down, a step that a range of public officials, environmentalists and residents have sought, particularly since Sept. 11, 2001, when one of the hijacked jets flew near the plant on its way to the World Trade Center. He was also not asked to look into the operation or safety of the plant itself.

But Mr. Witt's judgment of the disaster plan largely reflected complaints voiced for years by opponents of Indian Point, whose two active reactors in Buchanan, N.Y., about 35 miles north of Midtown Manhattan, supply 20 to 40 percent of the electricity for New York City and its suburbs.

The report said federal regulations guiding the disaster plan must be rewritten and tailored to Indian Point because of the potential catastrophe a large radioactive release poses to the densely populated area around the plant.

The current disaster plan focuses on the 298,013 people who live within 10 miles of the plant and would be most affected by a disaster. Although the report said the state should take into account people evacuating on their own outside of that 10-mile radius, it did not suggest that wholesale evacuation plans be developed for more distant places like New York City.

The report said that the effects of a radioactive release decrease with distance and that city officials would have more time to respond. "Considering the limited resources available, there is more urgency to improving the planning and associated activities" in the 10-mile area of the plant, it said.
Although federal officials predict that most deaths would occur within a 10-mile radius of the plant, radiation sickness and possible contamination of food and water could spread to 50 miles from it, an area of 20 million people that includes New York City, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The report also examined plans on Long Island for a disaster at the Millstone nuclear plant on the Connecticut shore but found that they "should be able to protect" the public.

Mr. Pataki, who ordered the report last August in response to the rising outcry over safety at the plant, declined to comment on it beyond a statement calling on federal authorities to review their standards for emergency plans "and determine if they are strong enough to meet the post-Sept. 11 reality."

Suzanne Morris, a spokeswoman, said Mr. Pataki wanted to give federal agencies a chance to respond to the report; a final version will be released next month. Mr. Pataki does not have the power to close the plant, but as governor he could use his pulpit to make a strong case before the N.R.C., which makes such determinations.

A spokeswoman for the N.R.C. said the agency would withhold comment on the 500-page report until a review was completed; the legal process of shutting the plant against the owner's will could take years and would still leave a large amount of radioactive material at the site.

Don Jacks, a spokesman for the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Washington, who has participated in Indian Point disaster drills, said he had not yet read the report. But Mr. Jacks said he did not disagree with the findings Mr. Witt outlined in a briefing with agency officials, who will prepare a response to the report.

Jim Steets, a spokesman for Entergy, which has owned and operated Indian Point 3 since November 2000 and Indian Point 2 since August 2001, said that the company would closely review the report but that it still believed the disaster plans could "protect public safety." (Indian Point 1, also owned by Entergy, has been dormant for several years.)

The report comes a few weeks before the state is supposed to send a normally routine annual certification to FEMA that state and local officials have met the objectives of the disaster plan. Ms. Morris said Mr. Pataki had not decided whether to certify the plan and might ask for a delay in sending the certificate, pending consultation with local officials.

The report galvanized opponents of the plant, who said it had confirmed their worst fears and would provide crucial ammunition in their fight to close it. They have long complained about the overall safety of the plant, which shut one reactor for nearly a year in 2000 because of a small leak. A recent report by a consultant for Entergy questioned the effectiveness of security at the plant, though state officials and Entergy have said security is tight.

Andrew J. Spano, the Westchester County executive, said that he had not yet read the whole report but that the county had already been working on improving plans to respond to emergencies at the plant.

"The plan has been in place a long time, and we knew it had deficiencies," Mr. Spano said in an interview. "But the bottom line is the plant shouldn't be here. The question here isn't, `Can you get the people out?' The question here is that the plants don't belong."

Last November, the N.R.C. said that a preliminary assessment by the federal emergency agency, based on a Sept. 24 drill, showed that the emergency plans were adequate.

But the Witt report disputed that finding, and said officials were more concerned with fulfilling antiquated regulations than with developing a workable plan.

Mr. Witt called the September disaster drill flawed in a number of ways. At one point, officials of nearby Putnam County who were in the field could not radio in mock radiation readings for some time because someone had apparently jammed the radio frequency. Some warning sirens did not work or could not be heard.

The Witt investigators found ignorance and skepticism about the plans not only among residents, but among emergency workers as well.

Few fire chiefs in the surrounding area "appeared to know their role in augmenting law enforcement, and when they heard of it, thought they would be ignored by the motoring public," the report said.
"Furthermore, they expressed pessimism that their volunteer firefighters would perform their roles instead of taking care of their families first," it said.

The report makes several other recommendations, including upgrading radios and other equipment that rescue workers use. Local officials and the plant must develop better computer models of how radiation might spew from the plant and what areas might be hit first.

It also suggested doing a better job of educating the public on how to respond in order to minimize panic.

Officials must also revise estimates of how long an evacuation might take and take into account the "shadow evacuation" of large numbers of people who would leave homes, schools and offices even without being ordered to do so, it said.

Entergy's Response

• We look forward to reviewing Mr. Witt’s report in depth and working with all parties – especially the counties and state and federal agencies – to improve the emergency plan. The report includes many items that we previously suggested. However, we believe the current emergency response plan does protect the health and safety of the public in the unlikely event of an emergency.
  
• Mr. Witt’s assertion that the emergency plan does not fully take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack is contrary to all that’s been done at Indian Point since 9/11 to prepare for just such a potential occurrence. Entergy has spent millions of dollars to upgrade security in contemplation of a range of potential terrorist scenarios, and feels confident we can repel any form of attack. After an in-depth inspection of the security precautions at Indian Point, the head of the state’s Office of Public Security said, “My feeling after this whole process is that this is an extremely safe place.”
  
• Our security enhancements since 9/11 include new weapons, training and manpower for our security force; new security perimeters that include concrete barriers, barbed wire, fencing, television monitors and motion detectors; new fortified entrances gates; new stringent identification systems for persons entering the plants; improved security along the river; and support from the National Guard, state police and local law enforcement agencies.
  
• With or without a terrorist attack, there cannot be a “fast-acting” scenario at Indian Point that would not allow adequate time to implement the emergency plan. Even prior to 9/11, safety systems were in place to prevent a major release of radiation. The plants cannot blow up like a bomb. The reactor containment structures would repel the crash of a large airliner. The pools housing used nuclear fuel are protected from all forms of attack, and several safety systems would prevent the fuel from igniting under even the most extreme scenarios.
  
• Mr. Witt did not speak with Entergy during preparation of his report, and there are some factual misstatements. We look forward to discussing them with Mr. Witt, as well as how his vision of a “fast-acting” attack differs from what we have contemplated, since his report provides no details of such a scenario.
  
• The report cites some deficiencies in equipment and other aspects of the plan, and we are eager to see that they are addressed. But taken together, we do not feel that they reduce the plan’s overall effectiveness.
  
• The emergency plan is developed by the four counties around Indian Point, and state emergency officials. Entergy participates, but plays a minor role, and indeed is only a small part of Mr. Witt’s 500-page report.
  
• It’s important to note that even if Indian Point were closed, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission still would require an emergency plan because of the spent fuel stored at the site. So in the final analysis, the discussion should not be about whether the plants should continue to operate, but about how, working together, we can improve the emergency plan.

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